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It has become commonplace for politicians and journalists to assert that the 
world economy is integrated and that no modem economy operates in isola- 
tion. International connections between economies are the focus of  political 
campaigns and cocktail-party discussions. World economic integration is not 
a new idea to economists, although there has been increased attention to these 
issues in recent years. But while we economists have considerable theory and 
evidence about the causes and effects of international trade in isolated mar- 
kets, little is yet known about the nature of macroeconomic connections be- 
tween  national  economies.  To  what  extent  are  common  macroeconomic 
movements associated with common disturbances, and to what extent are they 
associated with international transmission of  disturbances from some coun- 
tries to others? Through what channels does international transmission mainly 
operate? Similarly, to the extent that macroeconomic movements in different 
countries are not common, to what extent is this due to different disturbances, 
and to what extent does it reflect channels of  international transmission that 
create divergent movements in national economies? These issues are impor- 
tant for short-term macroeconomic policies and for more basic policy deci- 
sions such as the exchange-rate system. To  what extent does international 
transmission differ across alternative exchange-rate systems? 
One of the main theoretical arguments among economists for the adoption 
of floating exchange rates to replace the Bretton Woods system was that float- 
ing rates would allow countries to follow independent monetary policies. The 
argument was that fixed exchange rates required the international transmission 
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of monetary disturbances and restricted the independence of macroeconomic 
policies under Bretton Woods. According to this view, the international trans- 
mission of  monetary disturbances keeps inflation the same across countries 
with pegged exchange rates, and this international transmission would change 
under a floating-rate system. With hindsight, it is clear that the Bretton Woods 
system played  a role in  limiting the variability of  real  as well as nominal 
exchange rates.  There  is  considerable evidence that  international relative 
prices became greater when the Bretton Woods  system was abandoned and 
that the exchange-rate system plays a causal role in the variability of relative 
prices (see Stockman 1983; Mussa  1986; Baxter and  Stockman 1989; and 
Engel 1991). On the other hand, there is little evidence that quantities such as 
real production, consumption, or investment were so dramatically affected by 
the abandonment of Bretton Woods (see Baxter and Stockman 1989). The first 
observation suggests that the international transmission of  real disturbances 
(or the cross-country correlation of  those disturbances) may have changed 
dramatically with the abandonment of Bretton Woods. The second observa- 
tion, in contrast, suggests little change. 
The issue of international transmission is broad, partly because it can refer 
to a wide variety of exogenous changes in variables such as technology, tastes 
for one country’s goods versus another country’s goods, tastes for goods now 
versus future goods (savingskonsumption decisions), tastes for working (la- 
bor supply decisions), tax rates, government spending of various kinds (and 
on domestic or foreign goods), the money supply, the demand for money, or 
other variables. Moreover, any of the disturbances could be temporary or per- 
manent, anticipated or unanticipated. The transmission can occur through a 
variety of  channels, such as arbitrage in product markets or asset markets, 
substitution in product markets (e.g., substitution of one country’s goods for 
the  goods  of  another country),  changes in  demand  for foreign products, 
changes in supply due to changes in the costs of imported inputs, externalities 
in production, changes in foreign wealth due to changes in domestic asset 
prices, and so on. 
Some  channels  of  international  transmission  operate  regardless of  the 
exchange-rate system; others are dependent on the form of that system. Rather 
than discuss a catalog of  shocks and their international transmission under 
Bretton woods, it is useful to develop a framework that can be used and mod- 
ified to examine a variety of  shocks and transmission channels, and it is also 
useful to discuss the role of the Bretton Woods system in affecting transmis- 
sion in that framework. For example, in a completely neoclassical model with 
perfectly flexible prices, the exchange-rate system may be unrelated to the 
international transmission of a whole variety of real disturbances, although it 
may affect the transmission of nominal disturbances. Adding rigidities and 
imperfections to that model affects the way a whole set of real disturbances is 
transmitted internationally under a pegged exchange-rate system, so develop- 
ment of the framework permits us to address international transmission under 319  International Transmission under Bretton Woods 
Bretton  Woods without the repetition involved in  sequentially analyzing a 
long list of possible shocks. 
Any basic  framework that is to be useful in thinking about international 
transmission should be able to explain the main features that we observe in 
macroeconomic data under any exchange-rate system. These observations in- 
clude the facts that output is positively correlated across countries, consump- 
tion is positively correlated across countries, consumption is less well corre- 
lated across countries than output, Solow residuals are positively correlated 
across countries but less positively correlated than output, and the balance of 
trade surplus is countercyclical (see, e.g., Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland, in 
press; Costello 199  1 ;  Stockman and Tesar 199  1 ;  and Waldmann 1990). 
This paper presents a simple framework for analyzing the channels of inter- 
national transmission of a wide variety of disturbances and discusses interna- 
tional transmission of  real and monetary disturbances within several variants 
of that basic framework.' The paper then turns to evidence from the Bretton 
Woods  system. Because the Bretton Woods  system operated with full cur- 
rency convertibility for only a relatively short time, the system provided lim- 
ited evidence about international transmission. Previous studies have indi- 
cated not only that real exchange rates were less variable under Bretton Woods 
than under the subsequent system of floating rates but also that the behavior 
of  real macroeconomic quantities was not substantially different across the 
exchange-rate systems (Baxter and Stockman 1989). This presents a puzzle 
and makes it difficult to draw inferences about the international transmission 
of  real disturbances under Bretton Woods. Most economists believe that the 
difference in the behavior of  real exchange rates under the two systems is 
connected with sluggish price adjustment and related to differences in mone- 
tary policy. This paper presents evidence that the international transmission of 
inflation was limited and that countries had, and used, scope for independence 
of money-supply growth and inflation under Bretton Woods. 
6.1 
Consider the simple two-country, two-good endowment model described in 
Lucas (1982) and Svensson (1985).* At  each date t, the home country has a 
random endowment of  good X, k,,  and the foreign country has a random 
endowment of good X 5,.  Both goods are freely traded internationally. Each 
country has a fiat money, with supplies M,  and N, subject to random growth 
rates through lump-sum transfer payments to home (or foreign) country resi- 
dents. A representative household in each country maximizes discounted ex- 
A Simple Benchmark Model of International Bansmission 
1. A similar framework has been used in a number of  studies such as Cardia (1991), Frenkel 
2. Stockman (1980) examines exchange  rates  in  a similar model with incomplete financial 
and Razin (1987), Lundvik (1990), Mendoza (1991), and Stockman (1988a). 
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pected utility over an infinite horizon, with time-separable utility and a fixed 
discount rate. The representative household in the home country maximizes 
where xf  and yf are the household’s consumptions of home and foreign goods. 
The maximization is subject to a budget constraint and cash-in-advance con- 
straints. The cash-in-advance constraints require households to use sellers’ 
currencies for purchases; for the representative domestic household the first 
such constraint is 
(2) 
where P, is the home-currency price of home goods at date t, and M,  is the 
money that the household has available for spending on goods in date-t prod- 
uct markets. The household begins the period with M,- I  from last period. The 
home government increases the home country’s money supply (through lump- 
sum transfers to home residents) by 
(3) 
where M,-  I is the home money supply at the end of period t - 1. Households 
have previously traded assets with payoffs contingent on these lump-sum pay- 
ments, so the home household keeps only a fraction a1  of this transfer, paying 
a fraction (1 -  a,)  to the foreign hou~ehold.~ 
The second cash-in-advance constraint that the home household faces is 
(4)  P,*f 5  N, = N,-l + (0: - 1)~,-la2,,-l  , 
which has a similar interpretation, where P*  is the foreign-currency price of 
the foreign good, and a2  shows the extent to which the household collects 
payments of foreign money from the foreign representative household, con- 
tingent on foreign-country lump-sum transfers. 
After trading in product markets at date t, households trade in date-t asset 
markets subject to the constraint 
(5)  M, + e,N, + a,q, = W-, + (q  - l)fil-lal.,-l  -  P,x$ 
PIX:’ 5  M, = M,-l  + (w, - l)M,&  ,,-I  , 
M,  -  M,-l = (0, - l)M,-l, 
+ e,[N,-, + (w,* - 1)N,-la2,,-l  -  P,*yfl + cqTl(q, + 6,) , 
where e, is the exchange rate, a,  is a vector of four nonmoney assets that the 
representative domestic household owns at the end of  date t, and q, is the 
vector of date-t asset prices. The first two assets in the vector a  (a,  and az)  are 
the claims to shares of  lump-sum transfer payments discussed earlier. The 
second two assets (ag  and ad)  are claims to home and foreign endowments 
3. I discuss the role of these assets in international transmission below. 321  International Transmission under Bretton Woods 
(equities). The vector (Y  could be extended to include any other assets, but 
these assets are sufficient for a Pareto-optimal equilibrium in this model. The 
first two elements of the vector 6  are zero (their dividends are included in the 
cash-in-advance constraints), the third element is the value of  the home en- 
dowment, 2P,xr, and the fourth element is the value of  the foreign endow- 
ment, 2erP:yr. Total assets supplies are normalized at one. There is an analo- 
gous maximization problem for the representative household in the foreign 
country. 
One stationary rational expectations equilibrium in this model consists of 
home and foreign consumptions equal to half  the world endowments of  2xI 
and 5,: 
where asterisks denote foreign variables, and prices 
e, = 
There are other stationary rational expectations equilibria corresponding to 
different distributions of wealth between the home and the foreign countries. 
To  the extent that we know about the behavior of these other equilibria (as we 
do if preferences are members of the HARA class of utility functions), we can 
expect the international transmission of  disturbances to be  qualitatively the 
same in other stationary rational expectations equilibria. 322  Alan C. Stockman 
Suppose that transfers of home money are exogenous and that the foreign 
money supply adjusts to peg the exchange rate. This assumption affects only 
nominal prices because real allocations are independent of the exchange-rate 
system-and  money  supplies-in  this  benchmark  model.  Although  this 
model is quite limited, it provides a simple benchmark for the international 
transmission of real technology (endowment) and money-supply shocks. Ob- 
viously, real shocks in the home country are positively transmitted to foreign 
consumption in this model, and changes in the money supply are positively 
transmitted to the foreign money supply and nominal prices (under pegged 
exchange rates). 
This leaves the question of how real technology (endowment) shocks are 
transmitted to the foreign money supply and foreign nominal prices. The an- 
swer depends on the size of  the (intratemporal) elasticity of  substitution in 
consumption between foreign and domestic goods. To  see why, consider the 
effect of a  1 percent rise in the endowment of  the home good (X) at date t, 
holding fixed the home money supply. This reduces the equilibrium relative 
price of the home good at date t by more or less than 1 percent depending on 
whether the elasticity of  substitution is smaller or larger than one. Suppose 
that the money-growth rates exceed their critical values so that in equilibrium 
M  = P2x and N  = P*2y; then P falls by  1 percent. Since the exchange rate 
is pegged, the foreign-currency price of the foreign good must adjust so that 
the relative price of home and foreign goods, P/eP*,  reaches its new equilib- 
rium level. Since the foreign endowment has not changed, this occurs through 
a change in the foreign money supply to keep the exchange rate pegged. If 
the elasticity of substitution in consumption is greater than (less than) one, the 
equilibrium relative price P/eP* falls by  less (more) than  1 percent, so the 
foreign money supply N and the foreign-currency price of foreign goods, P*, 
must fall (rise) in equilibrium. Since the home price of home goods (P)  falls, 
we can say that there is positive transmission to the foreign money supply and 
foreign nominal prices if N and P* also fall.4 So there is positive transmission 
of the home endowment shock to foreign nominal variables if  the (intratem- 
poral) elasticity of  substitution in consumption is greater than one and nega- 
tive transmission if the elasticity of substitution is less than one.' 
6.2  Incomplete Financial Markets 
The model above contains assets a,  and a,  that do not exist in any obvious 
form in real-life economies. (There may,  of course, be other assets that pro- 
vide highly correlated returns so that those assets are not necessary.) Without 
these two assets, changes in the money supply in either country redistribute 
4. That is, we can use the term positive transmission as shorthand for a positive comovement of 
5. In general, this criterion also depends on the income elasticity of the demand for money, 
home and foreign variables due to a shock in one country. 
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wealth internationally, leading to some negative transmission in consumption. 
But the fraction of total wealth held as net nominal assets is small in real life, 
so the international wealth redistribution from unexpected changes in money 
supplies is probably not a major source of  international transmission. (If the 
redistributions were very large, we might expect to see the assets a,  and a2 
traded internationally.) The more important redistributions of wealth that are 
absent in the model above are those associated with changes in real asset val- 
ues when households have not used financial markets to diversify risks inter- 
nationally. The model outlined above neglects information costs and other 
frictions that limit international diversification. The question that concerns us 
here is, How important is this for international transmission? 
Dellas (1986) and Cole and Obstfeld (1991) have shown that, in a barter 
model like the one described above, incomplete financial markets may  not 
change the equilibrium much. In particular, if utility is Cobb-Douglas, the set 
of possible equilibria is exactly the same with complete financial markets and 
with no financial markets (each equilibrium corresponds to a particular distri- 
bution of wealth or utility weights in a social planner’s problem). Changes in 
endowments cause price changes that redistribute income on a period-by- 
period basis so that each household can afford to buy exactly the equilibrium 
consumption bundles specified above, and this maximizes the  household’s 
utility. For example, a 1 percent increase in the home endowment of X reduces 
its relative price by exactly 1 percent, raising the amount that foreign house- 
holds can afford (and choose to buy,  with this utility function) by  exactly 1 
percent. (Notice that the Cobb-Douglas assumption would result in exactly 
zero international transmission to foreign nominal prices in  the  monetary 
model outlined above.) 
Cole and  Obstfeld show  a  sense in  which the outcome is close to the 
complete-market situation if  utility is close to Cobb-Douglas. In this situa- 
tion, the incompleteness of  financial markets has little effect on the interna- 
tional transmission of real disturbances to technology: the transmission to for- 
eign consumption remains positive. This is an important issue because there 
were  serious restrictions on  international financial markets in  the Bretton 
Woods period. 
The result that restrictions on international financial markets do not have a 
major effect on the equilibrium is extremely sensitive to certain features of the 
model. As Cole and Obstfeld point out, if  each country produces a third 
traded good, an increase in its output in the home country (but not the foreign 
country) reduces its price and therefore reduces the value of the foreign coun- 
try’s output. When financial markets are incomplete, this redistributes income 
from the foreign to the home country, causing negative transmission in con- 
sumption spending. Similarly, when either country produces and consumes a 
nontraded good, changes in consumption of that nontraded good can alter the 
marginal utility of consumption of traded goods unless traded and nontraded 
goods are separable in utility, destroying the conclusion that the incomplete- 324  Alan C. Stockman 
markets equilibrium is the same as the complete-markets equilibrium even 
with Cobb-Douglas preferences. In this case, if  traded and nontraded goods 
are complements in consumption (as the evidence indicates), an increase in 
the home endowment of nontraded goods is transmitted negatively to foreign 
consumption of traded goods (see Stockman and Tesar 1991). 
The ability to trade on international financial markets also affects the inter- 
national transmission of  real  shocks to  technology if  there  is incomplete 
specialization in production (or endowment) of  traded goods and there are 
nation-speciJic productivity shocks.  With  complete specialization, there  is 
no distinction between industry-specific and nation-specific shocks to tech- 
nology.  But  suppose that  there  is  incomplete specialization: each country 
produces (or receives endowments of) both traded goods (X and Y).  If produc- 
tivity shocks are industry specijc, the model's prediction that the incomplete- 
markets equilibrium is identical with the complete-market equilibrium (with 
positive transmission of the shock to foreign consumption) continues to hold. 
If, for example, the home country produces three-fourths of the world's out- 
put of  X  and one-fourth of  its output of  Y, then technology shocks that are 
industry specific and worldwide produce the same equilibrium consumption 
and prices as the complete-specialization model. (In the extreme case, each 
country produces its own consumption bundle of traded goods, and there is 
no international trade.) But if  there are nation-speciJic productivity shocks, 
the result changes: an increase in productivity in the home country (in all 
industries) but not in the foreign country redistributes income from the foreign 
to the home country and causes a fall in foreign consumption relative to home 
consumption.6 The magnitude of  the income redistribution depends on the 
price change, which in turn depends on the elasticity of  substitution in con- 
sumption. If the redistribution is large enough, the positive productivity shock 
in one country causes a fall in foreign consumption, so there would be nega- 
tive international transmission in consumption. There is a general tendency 
for incomplete financial markets to cause negative international transmission 
because shocks can redistribute income from one country to another, leading 
to opposite wealth effects in the two countries. 
6.3  Disturbances to Preferences 
The discussion to this point has been limited by the assumption that all real 
shocks appear on the technology side. We  can add preference shocks to this 
model by respecifying utility as 
6. For evidence on nation-specific and industry-specific shocks,  see Stockman (1988b), Cos- 
tell0 (1991). and Waldmann (1990). 325  International Transmission under Bretton Woods 
where 
= (Tx,  Ty,  e-,  Ty*) 
is a vector of random taste shocks. Then an equilibrium allocation is 
xd  = X[IT~/(T,  + Ty,  xd*  = X[T,/(T,  + ..,*)I, 
y”  = Y[.rr,*/(.rr, + .rr,*>I,  y”*  = Y[TJ7FY  + 7F:>1, 
and 
because this  satisfies equality of  marginal utilities,  which  implies  IT.&  = 
n*xd*  such that xd + A?* = x and the analogous condition for good I: This 
implies that a positive taste shock for one of the goods in the home country (a 
full in ax,  e.g., which raises home consumption of  good X) is transmitted 
negatively to foreign consumption of that good. If  utility were nonseparable, 
foreign consumption of the good that is not subject to the shock rises or falls 
depending on the sign of the cross-derivative in utility, which could reinforce 
or mitigate the negative international transmission in consumption. 
6.4  Production 
The international transmission of technology disturbances in a model with 
production has received less attention except within one-sector models or at 
the  microeconomics  level  for  particular  industries.  lko recent  papers, 
Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (in press) and Baxter and Crucini (in press), 
address transmission issues (among other topics) in two-country, one-sector, 
real-business-cycle models. In these models, nation-specific shocks to tech- 
nology have some persistence, so a positive technology shock in the home 
country (alone) raises both current output and the expected marginal product 
of capital. If factors are sufficiently mobile internationally, factors move from 
the foreign to the home country, reducing foreign output and creating negative 
international transmission in production. If  people have pooled risk in asset 
markets to a sufficient degree (as in the models cited), the shock is transmitted 
positively to foreign consumption: domestic and foreign consumption move 
together. The negative transmission to foreign production and positive trans- 
mission to foreign consumption make it difficult for these models to explain 
the observation that the international correlation of  consumption is positive 
but smaller than that of production. In fact, the cross-country correlation of 
industrial production was higher in the Bretton Woods period than after 1973 
(see Baxter and Stockman 1989). One explanation is that there were (and are) 
seriously incomplete international financial markets or that, because of infor- 
mation costs, people did (and do) not make use of available financial markets 
to  diversify  internationally.  Other  explanations  include  nontraded  goods 326  Alan C. Stockman 
(Stockman and Dellas 1989)’ and preference shocks that changed consump- 
tion independently across countries (Stockman and Tesar 1991). 
Productivity shocks are transmitted internationally even if factors are inter- 
nationally immobile. There are three main channels of transmission. First, if 
foreign and domestic goods are perfect substitutes in consumption as in the 
one-sector models cited above, then  increased output in the home country 
reduces the real interest rate. The fall in the real interest rate can reduce for- 
eign output temporarily through intertemporal substitution in labor supply and 
in the utilization rate of  capital. This interest-rate channel creates negative 
transmission of a home productivity shock to foreign output. This channel of 
transmission also operates, although with less strength, when home and for- 
eign goods are imperfect substitutes. 
A second channel of  transmission also occurs through demand. Suppose 
that leisure and consumption are substitutes in utility in the sense of a negative 
cross-derivative in the utility function. Then a home productivity disturbance 
in a risk-pooled world raises foreign consumption. Since this reduces the for- 
eign marginal utility of leisure, it raises foreign employment and output. This 
tends to create positive international transmission to foreign output. 
A third channel of transmission occurs through demand for capital inputs. 
Here temporary and permanent productivity shocks can be transmitted differ- 
ently to foreign countries. A temporary productivity shock in the home coun- 
try creates a trade surplus in the home country as domestic consumption and 
foreign consumption rise.  With  repeated shocks, consumption tends to be 
more highly correlated across countries than is output. On the other hand, a 
permanent or highly persistent productivity shock in the home country can 
cause a trade deficit because the shock raises the expected marginal product 
of investment and imports of (or to be used as) capital. If equilibrium invest- 
ment in the home country rises more than output, the home country can have 
a trade deficit in the short run. If  the productivity shock is persistent but not 
permanent, then it dies away as time passes, so eventually the increased home 
output (from higher productivity and a higher capital stock) exceeds the in- 
crease in investment. Then the trade deficit can turn to a trade surplus. 
When productivity shocks are positively correlated across countries, home 
and foreign output can move together even without any international transmis- 
sion of disturbances. This creates the difficult empirical issue of  distinguish- 
ing the transmission of  shocks from correlated disturbances in different coun- 
tries. Evidence from Costello (1991) and Waldmann (1990) indicates that the 
cross-country correlation of Solow residuals, intended to measure technology 
shocks, is lower than the cross-country correlation of outputs. If  this were the 
7. Nonseparability in utility between consumption of nontraded and traded goods can create 
less than perfect correlation in consumption  of traded goods even with complete markets because 
a change in production and consumption of the home nontraded good alters equilibrium home 
consumption of the traded good, tending to move home and foreign consumption of  traded goods 
in opposite directions. 327  International Transmission under Bretton Woods 
only source of exogenous disturbances, we might attribute the excess corre- 
lation of output (over productivity shocks) to transmission.* 
6.5  International ’kansmission in the Presence of Nontraded Goods 
Nontraded goods can play an important role in international transmis~ion.~ 
Consider a productivity shock in the home country nontraded-goods industry. 
This is likely to raise home consumption of  nontraded goods, and, because 
traded and nontraded goods are complements in consumption (see above), this 
raises home demand for traded goods. In equilibrium, home consumption of 
traded goods rises-partly  through increased foreign output of  traded goods 
and partly through decreased foreign consumption of  traded goods. (Home 
output of traded goods might increase because of the increase in demand, or 
it  might  decrease  because  of  the  increase  in  factor productivity  in  the 
nontraded-goods sector, leading factors to migrate to that sector.) So the pro- 
ductivity disturbance in the home nontraded sector can be transmitted posi- 
tively to foreign production and negatively to foreign consumption (see Stock- 
man and Tesar 1991). 
Similar results follow from preference shocks. Consider a preference shock 
in the home country that temporarily raises the marginal utility of consump- 
tion of  all goods. This causes a home-country trade deficit, raises traded- 
goods output in both countries, and raises nontraded-goods output in the home 
country (because of complementarity  between traded and nontraded goods in 
consumption). Output of nontraded goods in the foreign country falls both 
because foreign factors move from the nontraded- to the traded-goods indus- 
try in response to the higher relative price of  traded goods (due to the taste 
shock) and because foreign consumption of traded goods falls and (through 
complementarity)  reduces foreign demand for nontraded goods. So the shock 
is transmitted positively to foreign output of traded goods, negatively to for- 
eign output of nontraded goods, and negatively to foreign consumption. The 
taste shock also raises the relative price of the domestic consumption bundle, 
which includes home nontraded goods, so it causes real appreciation in the 
home country that appears under a pegged exchange-rate system as a rise in 
the home price level relative to the foreign price level. The importance of 
nontraded goods for international transmission is  enhanced when  govern- 
ments “create” nontraded goods out of  traded goods through restrictions on 
international trade; overall, trade restrictions were somewhat higher under 
Bretton Woods (particularly before the Kennedy Round tariff reductions) than 
they are today. 
8. This runs into problems associated with differences across countries in the timing of  the 
effects of productivity shocks on output. The response to a common shock may occur more rapidly 
in one country than another despite the absence of  “transmission” across countries. 
9. For an entirely different channel of  international transmission of monetary disturbances in 
the presence of  nontraded goods than that summarized below, see Miller and Todd (1991). 328  Alan C. Stockman 
6.6  International 'lkansmission with Sticky Prices 
Sticky prices are widely  regarded as an important feature of  macroeco- 
nomic data. Svensson (1986) added short-run price stickiness to a model sim- 
ilar to the one discussed above, using it to investigate the international trans- 
mission of fiscal policy in Svensson (1987) and the international transmission 
of  monetary  disturbances under floating  exchange rates  in  Svensson  and 
van  Wijnbergen (1989). To  discuss international transmission under Bretton 
Woods, I will examine the effects of  monetary disturbances with fixed ex- 
change rates in Svensson's model. 
The setup of the model remains mostly the same: the representative house- 
hold in the home country maximizes (1) subject to the sequence of constraints 
(2), (4),  and (3,  and there is an analogous problem for the foreign represent- 
ative household. Now,  however, firms set nominal prices one period in ad- 
vance as in Svensson (1986) and Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1989). Out- 
put in each country per capita is determined by demand subject to the capacity 
constraints 
The capacity constraints imply that, if  demand exceeds capacity, there is ra- 
tioning: 
4 I  x,  and  yf I  y,. 
The foreign money supply adjusts to keep the exchange rate pegged at 
e, = e  V t. 
Define the exogenous part of the state vector by 
s,  = (XI, Y,, 0,). 
Assume that the vectors is random and independently drawn over time. 
An equilibrium is a set of functions of  the state vector s and the predeter- 
mined variables-nominal  prices and the levels of  the beginning-of-period 
money stocks of  each country-used  to describe output and each country's 
consumption of each good, nominal goods prices set for the following period, 
the foreign money-growth rate,  asset holdings, and  asset prices,  such that 
each representative consumer maximizes utility subject to its budget and cash- 
in-advance constraints, firms maximize market value by choice of  nominal 
prices, and markets clear with a fixed exchange rate. Assume that firms oper- 
ate in the monopolistically competitive environment described in Svensson 
(1986), which builds on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), and assume that a station- 
ary rational expectations equilibrium exists. 
Although many of  the characteristics of  the equilibrium of  this model are 
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rates, international transmission under the pegged-rate system considered here 
differs from the discussion by  Svensson and van  Wijnbergen for a flexible 
exchange-rate system. Notice that the price-setting problem facing firms is a 
stationary problem. Svensson’s proof that firms set nominal prices proportion- 
ally to the current money supply applies to this model, so at time t - 1 firms 
set period-t prices by the formulas 
where k and k*  are constants. 
The possible stationary equilibria of the model divide into three parameter 
regions for each country,  depending on  whether the cash-in-advance con- 
straint binds, the output-capacity (full-employment) constraint binds, or nei- 
ther Constraint binds (so there are nine regions in all because there are two 
countries). Obviously, small changes in monetary policy have no effects on 
output if  the full-capacity constraint is binding (except at the border of that 
region). But monetary policy has real effects in the other regions. First sup- 
pose that the cash-in-advance constraint for spending on the domestic good 
but nor the domestic full-capacity constraint binds. Then home output is 
M 
2x  =  = wfk. 
‘  p, 
Similarly, if  the cash-in-advance constraint for spending on the foreign good 
but not the foreign full-capacity constraint binds, then foreign output is 
Now  consider the equilibrium region in which neither the cash-in-advance 
constraint nor the full-capacity constraint binds for either good. In the interior 
of this region, home output and foreign output per capita solve the equations 
hf - A  X*  A* 
U,(x,,  yJ = - - - and  U,(x,, y,) =  = -  P‘  Of  P,*  0; ’ 
where A  and A* are positive constants that come from the first-order condi- 
tions for choices of  end-of-period money holdings. A and A*  are constants 
because of the assumption that shocks are i.i.d. (so that expected future vari- 
ables are independent of the current state). 
Now  consider the international transmission of  monetary policy  in this 
fixed-exchange-rate model with  sticky prices.  First suppose that,  for each 
good, the cash-in-advance constraint binds but that the full-capacity constraint 
does not. In this region, a permanent rise in the home money supply (a posi- 
tive i.i.d.  shock to the home country’s money-growth rate) raises home out- 
put. It has no effect on foreign output unless it affects the foreign money sup- 330  Alan C. Stockman 
ply.  Since the  exchange rate in  period-t asset markets (after the close of 
period-t product markets is 
MtA*k 
e, = 7 
NtAk* 
an increase in the home money supply leads to an equal proportional increase 
in the foreign money supply to keep the exchange rate pegged: 
- M  A*k 
o,*  = o,e, L 
Nt-  ,Ak* ' 
So in this region-where  for each good the cash-in-advance constraint binds 
but the full-capacity constraint does not-an  increase in the home money sup- 
ply raises real output in both countries: there is positive international transmis- 
sion to foreign output. (Under a flexible-exchange-rate system, in contrast, 
there is no transmission to foreign output in this region if the home monetary 
expansion leaves the foreign money supply unaffected.) 
Now  consider the region in which neither the cash-in-advance constraint 
nor the liquidity constraint binds for either good. Svensson and van Wijnber- 
gen demonstrate that, under a floating-exchange-rate system, a home mone- 
tary expansion has two effects, with opposite signs, on  foreign output. A 
home monetary expansion raises output and consumption of the home good, 
while, given the foreign rate of  money growth, the effect on foreign output 
depends on the sign of the cross-derivative in the utility function, U,2.  Foreign 
output rises, remains the same, or falls depending on whether U,,  is positive, 
zero, or negative.lO This cross-derivative is positive (or negative) if and only 
if  the  intertemporal elasticity of  substitution in  aggregate consumption is 
greater (or less) than the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between con- 
sumption of home and foreign goods. So under flexible exchange rates there 
is positive international transmission of output in  response to a permanent 
monetary disturbance if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution exceeds the 
elasticity of intratemporal substitution  between home and foreign goods. Oth- 
erwise, a permanent increase in the home money supply is transmitted nega- 
tively to foreign output. 
Under pegged exchange rates, there is a third effect. The foreign money 
supply rises proportionally to the increase in the home money supply, imply- 
ing equal percentage changes in the marginal utility of consumption of home 
10. This follows directly from the expressions for home and  foreign output  in  this region. 
Suppose, e.g.,  that output and consumption of the home good increases. If U,,  > 0, this raises the 
marginal utility of consumption of the  foreign good, so we require  an  increase in  output  and 
consumption of the foreign good to bring its marginal utility back to the unchanged equilibrium 
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output and the marginal utility of consumption of foreign output. This implies 
that foreign output rises regardless of the relative magnitudes of the intertem- 
poral and intratemporal elasticities of substitution in consumption: 
and 
While this model predicts short-run real effects of monetary disturbances, 
it does not predict differences in inflation across countries under pegged ex- 
change rates. Figures 6.1-6.3  below show that, despite a period of  stable 
nominal exchange rates from 1962 until the end of  the decade, there were 
sizable differences in  inflation across countries (measured using consumer 
price indexes). Even during the period before the devaluation of  sterling in 
1967, the average inflation rate was higher in Japan, Italy, and the Netherlands 
than in Canada, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and  Belgium and 
lower in the United States. From 1962 to 1967, inflation in the United States 
averaged 1.9 percent per year, while inflation in Japan, Italy, and the Nether- 
lands was above 4 percent per year. 
In the model discussed here, nominal prices are predetermined each period, 
so there is no  short-run effect of  the home monetary expansion on nominal 
prices in this model. But prices change in the periods following a monetary 
disturbance. Since nominal prices for date t + 1 are set at date t in proportion 
to the period-t money supply, an increase in the home money supply at date t 
could in principle affect the relative price of home and foreign goods starting 
at date t + 1. The assumption of  i.i.d. shocks, however, prevents this from 
occurring: the foreign money supply and the foreign nominal price of the for- 
eign good rise in proportion to the change in the home money supply, to keep 
the exchange rate pegged. So this model produces real effects of  monetary 
disturbances through sticky prices, but it cannot (in this form) explain why 
short-run inflation rates may differ across countries with pegged exchange 
rates. To  do that probably requires a model with real costs of short-run arbi- 
trage, as in Dumas (19871, where arbitrage occurs with a delay because of the 
time required to ship goods from one country to another. For some time fol- 
lowing an unexpected disturbance (but not permanently), nominal prices in 
the home country can differ from nominal prices in the foreign country. Al- 
though Dumas’s model is real, it is reasonable to conjecture that a monetary 
version of his model would imply that monetary shocks in a country can have 
short-term effects on domestic inflation even under a pegged exchange-rate 
system. Further theoretical study of this issue would be worthwhile because 
the next section presents evidence that suggests that monetary policy was able 332  Alan C. Stockman 
to affect inflation in the short run under the Bretton Woods  system despite 
pegged exchange rates. 
6.7  Evidence of the International Pansmission of Inflation 
The Bretton Woods system consisted of an initial phase in which most cur- 
rencies were nonconvertible, international trade in goods and financial assets 
was severely restricted, and international trade that did occur was mainly bi- 
lateral barter. Because of the peculiar difficulties arising from inconvertibility 
and extensive controls as well as an absence of  reliable data, the analysis 
below concentrates on the second period of  Bretton Woods, after 1958, in 
which currencies were convertible and for which more reliable data become 
available. For much of the analysis, the sample period is restricted further. 
Figure 6.1 shows nominal exchange rates against the U.S. dollar for a set 
of eight countries under this second phase of the Bretton Woods system. There 
is no long period of  fixed exchange rates: the longest such period is from 
1962:3, when Canada pegged to the U.S. dollar (or 1961:2, after Germany’s 
revaluation), through  1967:3, before the devaluation of  the pound sterling. 
Figure 6.2 shows inflation under Bretton Woods in the same nine countries 
(measured with consumer price indexes). Even for subperiods during which 
nominal exchange rates were pegged, inflation differentials across countries 
were large. Average inflation during 1963-67,  shown in figure 6.3, ranged 
from 1.9 percent per year in the United States to rates above 4 percent in the 
Netherlands, Italy, and Japan. Figure 6.4 shows real exchange rates, defined 
as the relative price of the U.S. CPI bundle of  goods in terms of  the home 
country’s CPI bundle (i.e., as e*P[United States]/P[n] for nation n). The most 
striking aspect of  the figure is that these relative prices change dramatically 
when nominal exchange rates change with currency devaluations or revalua- 
tions. This fact is well known and often cited as evidence that nominal prices 
are sticky, so that devaluations cause changes in relative prices. A further 
striking observation is that there appears to be little tendency for the relative 
price changes accompanying devaluations to reverse themselves in subsequent 
months or years.  l1 
Because the Bretton Woods experience was brief  after the restoration of 
currency convertibility in  1958, the evidence on international transmission 
available from the Bretton Woods period is quite limited. To draw inferences 
with as much evidence as possible from these limited data, this paper makes 
use of  the combined cross-sectionavtime-series feature of the data by  testing 
and imposing constraints on coefficients across equations for various coun- 
11. These revelations and devaluations are, in one sense, the biggest economic shocks to occur 
under the Bretton Woods system. They had major effects on real exchange rates. By far the largest 
changes in real exchange rates during this period occurred with these changes in official pegs. Yet 
they appear to have had little effect on international trade, output, employment, and other vari- 
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tries. Furthermore, the discussion below focuses on international differences 
in inflation across countries rather than on the level of inflation in each coun- 
try.  By  examining differences between pairs of  countries, the analysis can 
abstract from issues concerning worldwide price changes that affected coun- 
tries equally and focus on the limits to international transmission of inflation 
during this period. 
At  first glance, it appears that there is no relation between differences in 
inflation across countries and differences in money-supply growth rates across 
countries (measured by any monetary aggregates). Simple correlations are all 
close to zero. The average correlation between contemporaneous differences 
of  quarterly growth rates of M1 and CPIs-across  all pairs of countries in a 
sample including Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States for periods during which the exchange rate was  fixed-is 
negative. Correlations close to zero also appear at most leads and lags, except 
when one of the countries in the pair is the United States. Similarly, bivariate 
Granger-causality tests show no relation between international differences in 
inflation and money-growth rates. For the sample of countries including Can- 
ada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States, al- 
most every pairing shows no Granger causality in either direction. These re- 
sults are consistent with the monetary approach to the balance of payments if 
differences in inflation across countries reflect measurement error, in which 
case they are unrelated to changes in nominal money demand and, as a result, 
nominal money supply. They are not clearly supportive of the monetary ap- 
proach if international differences in inflation result from changes in the rela- 
tive prices of nontraded goods, in which case higher-inflation countries might 
be expected to have greater growth rates of nominal money demand and so 
nominal money supplies. 
But the implications of  the data change dramatically when other relevant 
variables are included in the analysis: there is evidence that changes in the 
money supply in one country led to subsequent changes in that country's infla- 
tion rate (given foreign inflation) in the short run. That is, there was  only 
partial international transmission of foreign inflation to the domestic country 
in the short run. The short sample of  data is not able to provide strong evi- 
dence about the long run; the evidence reported here is not inconsistent with 
the idea that the effects of domestic money growth on domestic inflation van- 
ished in the long run so that the international transmission of foreign inflation 
to each country was complete in the long run. On the other hand, the data for 
the Bretton Woods period do not provide strong evidence for or against any 
hypothesis about the long run. 
Because the time series are short but there are data for several nations, the 
results reported below  are estimated jointly  across country pairs,  allowing 
disturbances to be contemporaneously correlated (although uncorrelated at all 
leads and lags), and impose restrictions that certain coefficients are identical 336  Alan C. Stockman 
across equations. (The coefficient restrictions were also tested as described 
below.) Specifically, let 
S(U, b,  X)  = X(U) -  x(b) 
be an operator that takes the difference in the variable x between countries a 
and  b.  For example,  G[France, Germany, d log(p)]  = d log(p)France  - d 
log(p)ammy. Denote the price level measured by the CPI (other measures give 
results similar to those reported below) by p,  the narrow money supply by 
M 1, the three-month nominal interest rate by  i, and real GDP by y.  Consider 
joint estimation of the equations 
1 
6  nation, US, d log@)  = a(L)6 nation, US, d log(p)  11  I 
1  [ 
[ 
1 
(6)  + p(L)8 nation, US, d log(M1)  + T(L,  nation)6(nation, US,  i) 
+ q(L,  nation) 6  nation, US, d log(y)  + &(nation) 
for nation  = Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. All 
variables are quarterly and expressed as deviations from means. They are sea- 
sonally adjusted at the source, although the equation also included seasonal 
dummies. 
Begin by  imposing the restriction that all coefficients are identical across 
nations. A test of this restriction for each set of coefficients (one set at a time) 
showed that some of these restrictions were rejected. Consider, for example, 
the hypothesis that T(L, nation) and q(L,  nation) are the same for all nations 
except Canada; that is, T(L,  nation) = T(L)  and q(L,  nation) = q(L)  for all 
nations except Canada (where T[L]  and q[L]  do not depend on the nation). 
Wald tests of these hypotheses generate chi-square statistics with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of restrictions. Almost all these tests led to rejec- 
tions at p-values smaller than .OW1 .I2 As a result, these coefficients are left 
unconstrained  in the results reported below.  (Those estimates show clearly 
that T[L]  and q[L]  differ across nations.) 
On the other hand, one cannot reject (at any reasonable significance level) 
the hypothesis that the coefficients a(L)  and p(L)  are independent of the na- 
tion, with one exception: a(4)  for Canada is significantly different than a(4) 
for other countries. So, with this exception, the estimates reported below im- 
pose the restrictions that the vectors a  and p are independent of the nation. 
They also assume that V(E) = Z is a symmetric positive definite matrix and 
that V(u,,  u,-J  = 0 for all t and s. While a(0) = 0, the parameters p(O), r(O), 
and q(0) were estimated along with the other parameters. Because standard 
models imply that the differentials in money-growth rates are endogenous and 
12. The Canadian-French case was an exception: thep-value was .18. This might suggest that 
the coefficients for Canada and France could be constrained to be identical, although the estimates 
reported here do not impose this constraint. 337  International Transmission under Bretton Woods 
could be correlated with the disturbances, the estimates reported below were 
obtained using instrumental variables. The instruments were-in  addition to 
all lagged variables in the equation-current  and lagged values of  the U.S. 
federal funds rate and the growth rate of  the U.S.  monetary base. The lag 
length for each variable is four quarters (experiments indicated that longer 
lags do not affect the results). 
The first results, for the period  196O:l-1971:2,  appear in table 6.1. The 
actual period differs across countries because of data availability (see the data 
appendix). The estimates show strong effects of lagged differentials in money 
growth  on  the  inflation  differential.I3 The  sum of  the  coefficients on  the 
money-growth differential is .28, indicating (subject to the usual caveats on 
this interpretation) that a sustained 1 percent rise in domestic money growth 
relative to foreign money growth leads to a .28 percent rise in the inflation 
differential under pegged exchange rates. The effect of the contemporaneous 
money-growth differential is small; most of the effect is associated with lagged 
money-growth differentials.  l4 
Estimated coefficients on interest-rate differentials and income-growth dif- 
ferentials vary  significantly from country to country. Wald  tests of  the null 
hypothesis that the (lagged or current and lagged) money-differential coeffi- 
cients are jointly zero are rejected at more than the .0001 level. There is little 
evidence of autocorrelation of residuals, as the table shows, and tests that the 
disturbances are normally distributed fail to reject that hypothesis at the usual 
significance levels. The results are nearly identical when the equations are 
estimated for a  shorter  sample period  that  excludes Canadian data before 
1962:3, when the Canadian dollar floated against the U.S.  dollar, and after 
1970:1, when  it floated again; German data starting in  1969:4, when the 
deutsche mark  was  revalued; and  U.K.  data starting in  1967:4, when  the 
pound was devalued. Again, there is a strong connection between inflation 
differentials and lagged money-growth differentials. 
The natural interpretation of these results is that the governments of  these 
countries had  some control over  money  growth despite pegging  their ex- 
change rates: central banks were able to and sometimes did “sterilize” changes 
in international reserves to affect domestic money growth.  l5  Moreover, these 
differential rates of growth of money appear to have affected inflation differ- 
entials. One cannot, however, rule out other (reverse-causality) interpretations 
13. When the equation is reestimated allowing for eight lags of money-growth differentials, the 
chi-square statistic for the hypothesis that the coefficients on lags 5-8  are jointly zero is only 2.08 
(p-value  = .72). And all four of these coefficients were very close to zero individually. So only 
the four lags were included in subsequent estimates. 
14. The equation also includes nominal-interest differentials and GDP-growth differentials. Full 
results were reported in the first draft of this paper and are available on request from the author. 
15. Iwami (1991) discusses monetary policies under Bretton Woods and compares that system 
to the gold standard; he argues that U.S.  policy under Bretton Woods did not follow the analogous 
“rules of the game” for a gold standard. Iwami argues that U.S. neglect of the rules of the game 
allowed other countries to pursue expansionary policies and that this system was viable for the 
short run but not the long run, so it eventually broke down after its credibility had been strained. 338  Alan C. Stockman 
Table 6.1  Effects of Money-Growth  Differentials  on Inflation Differentials 










































Canada  France  Germany  Italy  UK 
~  ~ 
R2  .64  .58  .79  .74  .68 
Autocorrelations of Residuals 
Canada  France  Germany  Italy  UK 
~ 
1st  .I0  -  .03  .I1  -  .23  .I3 
2d  .16  -  .31  .28  -  .01  -.18 
3d  .04  .15  .06  .18  -  .28 
4th  .03  .04  -  .06  -  .07  -  .I1 
SE  .I6  .19  .I1  .17  .19 
p-value'  .82  .52  .55  .38  SO 
Nore: These are joint  instrumental  variables estimates  of  eqq. (6): the dependent variable is 
&[nation, US, d log(p)]. The equation also includes current and lagged values of interest-rate 
differentials and differentials of GDP growth rates; the coefficients of these variables were allowed 
to differ across countries. 
When money-growth differentials are excluded from the equations, the R2  vector is  .35 for 
Canada, .54 for France, .76 for Germany, .72 for Italy, and .54 for the United Kingdom. 
'p-value refers to the Box-Pierce Q-statistic for the first four autocorrelations. 
of the results. For example, it is possible that differentials in inflation were 
caused by changes in relative prices of  nontraded goods (which show up in 
retail prices of  traded goods because of nontraded components of value added 
such as retailing and transportation). To explain the correlation between infla- 
tion differentials and lagged money-growth differentials, the real disturbances 
would have to raise the monetary aggregates through their effects on demands 
for money and credit before  raising the prices of nontraded goods (raising the 
international inflation differential). 
There is very little difference between the estimates reported in  table 4.1 
and ordinary least squares (seemingly unrelated regression) estimates of  the 
equations. Tests of  exogeneity of contemporaneous money-growth differen- 
tials, interest differentials, and income-growth differentials (using Hausman's 
specification test) fail to reject exogeneity at any reasonable significance level. 339  International Transmission under Bretton Woods 
This provides some evidence that the relation between money-growth differ- 
entials and inflation differentials reflects some degree of monetary-policy au- 
tonomy under the Bretton Woods system rather than feedback from inflation 
differentials (induced by  real shocks) to money  growth differentials as pre- 
dicted by the monetary approach to the balance of payments. 
Figure 6.5 plots the residuals from these equations, and figure 6.6  plots the 
actual and fitted values. Although the period includes dates of  revaluations 
and devaluations, there is no visual indication of unusual behavior of residuals 
around-before  or after-those  dates. This result parallels the finding in Bax- 
ter and Stockman (1989) that changes in the exchange-rate system, and in the 
variability of  real exchange rates, seem to be unconnected with macroeco- 
nomic  or  intemational-trade quantity  variables.  In  this  case,  the  major 
changes in real exchange rates that occur at the time of  finite revaluations 
seem to have little effect on inflation differentials or the relation between infla- 
tion differentials and money-growth differentials. 
Experimentation with the data revealed that the connection between money- 
growth and inflation differentials varies with the overall level of nominal inter- 
est rates. Table 6.2  presents results from an equation that adds the contempo- 
raneous level of  the U.S. short-term interest rate (three-month Treasury-bill 
rate) to the equation, with a coefficient that differs across countries. The set of 
instrumental variables remains unchanged from previous tables: the only con- 
temporaneous variables included among instruments were the growth rate of 
the U.S.  monetary base and the U.S. Federal funds rate. The contempora- 
neous level of interest rates has a statistically significant effect on the interest 
differential between the United States and France and  between the United 
States and Germany (although in opposite directions in  the two cases). A 
Wald test that the coefficients of the U.S. nominal interest rate are jointly zero 
leads to rejection of  that hypothesis at the ,0001 level. Holding the level of 
the nominal interest rate fixed strengthens the effects of lagged money-growth 
differentials on  inflation differentials. The  sum of  coefficients on  money- 
growth differentials rises from .28 to .48,  and the sum on lagged differentials 
rises from .26 to .44. 
Table 6.3 presents estimates of  a similar set of  equations for the inflation 
differential between Germany and other nations in the sample. France is ex- 
cluded from this sample because chi-square tests indicated that the French 
coefficients  differed from the coefficients  of  other countries. The U.S. nominal 
interest rate is included as in table 6.2.  The results continue to show a positive 
effect of  lagged money-growth differentials on the inflation differential and 
virtually no contemporaneous effect. The sum of the money coefficient is .26. 
Similar results appear when other countries are used for comparison. As be- 
fore, there is little evidence of misbehavior of the residuals of the equations in 
the form of autocorrelation  or departures from normality. Nor do the residuals 
behave any differently around periods of devaluations. 
These results suggest that, when central banks engaged in sterilization pol- 340  Alan C. Stockman 
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Table 6.2  Inflation Differentials and Money-Growth Differentials with the Level 
of the U.S. Interest Rate Included 
Coeff.  SE  r-Stat.  p-Value 
6d log (Ml),  ,040  ,021  1.89  .07 
6d log  (MI),-,  ,117  ,019  6.12  .oo 
6d log  ,076  ,019  3.88  .oo 
M log  ,088  ,021  4.03  .oo 
1%  (M1),-4  ,057  ,021  2.70  .01 
&flog  (PL,  ,059  ,070  .83  .41 
6d log  (P),+  -  ,046  ,070  -  .65  .52 
ad log (P),-~  ,094  ,065  1.45  .I6 
6d log (JJ),+~,  others  ,017  ,071  .24  .81 
6d log  (P),+~,  Canada  ,688  ,151  4.54  .oo 
Canada  France  Germany  Italy  UK 
R2  .67  .60  .88  .72  .68 
Nore: These are joint instrumental variables estimates of eqq. (6) as in table 6.1, except the U.S. 
three-month Treasury-bill rate is included in each equation with a coefficient that can differ across 
equations. 
icies under the Bretton Woods system, they were able to affect not only the 
domestic money supply in the short run but also the domestic inflation rate in 
the short run. This sterilization limited the extent to which changes in foreign 
inflation were transmitted in the short run to the country. (Because the sample 
is short, the estimates cannot provide much evidence about long-run effects of 
sterilization.) The question then arises as to whether these short-run limits on 
the international transmission of inflation spilled over to real variables. 
First, notice that the estimates given above imply that there were predict- 
able differences in inflation across countries under Bretton Woods, related to 
prior differences in money-growth rates. But these predictable changes in in- 
flation differentials  appear not  to  have been  fully reflected  in  changes in 
nominal-interest differentials. Instead, they occurred mainly as changes in ex 
post real interest-rate differentials. Because these interest differentials were 
predictable, it may be reasonable to interpret them as ex ante real interest-rate 
differentials. (Such ex ante real interest differentials are not necessarily ruled 
out by arbitrage; they are consistent with expected changes in relative prices 
of the CPI bundles of goods in different countries.) 
Table 6.4 shows estimates of a set of nominal-interest-differential equations 
specified in accordance with the earlier equations for inflation differentials. 
There is some evidence of a positive effect of lagged money-growth differen- 
tials on nominal-interest differentials. (The hypothesis that the coefficients on 
the money-growth differentials are jointly zero is rejected at the .OW1  level.) 
But the positive effect of lagged money differentials is small. Money growth 
rates are quarterly growth rates, while the nominal interest differential is in 343  International Transmission under Bretton Woods 
Table 6.3  Germany as the Comparison Country 
Coeff.  SE  t-Stat. 
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Canada  Italy  UK  us 
R2  .75  .37  .64  .89 
Note:  These are joint instrumental variables estimates of  eqq. (6) as in table 6.2, except the base 
country against which differentials are computed is Germany rather than the U.S. 
Table 6.4  Money and Nominal-Interest  Differentials 
Two-Tail 
Coeff.  SE  t-stat.  p-Value 
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Canada  France  Germany  Italy  UK 
R2  .68  .81  .82  .94  .51 
Nore: These are joint instrumental variables estimates of  an equation like (6), except the depen- 
dent variable is the difference betweea the country’s short-term  nominal-interest rate and the U.S. 
three-month Treasury-bill rate, G(nation, US,  i). 
percentage points at annual rates. So a coefficient of about four on the money- 
growth differential would indicate that a 1 percentage point rise in the money- 
growth differential raises  the  nominal-interest differential by  1 percentage 
point. In fact, the sum of the first four lagged coefficients is only about 1.5, 
and the coefficient on contemporaneous money is negative. So, besides the 344  Alan C. Stockman 
positive effect of  lagged money differentials, there is weak evidence of a li- 
quidity effect on nominal interest rates in the first quarter.16 
The fact that an increase in the money-growth differential-which  is asso- 
ciated with a lagged rise in the inflation differential-is  accompanied by a fall 
in the expected real-interest differential (and perhaps a shorter-run fall in the 
nominal-interest differential) is some evidence in favor of the hypothesis that 
countries had (and used) some degree of monetary autonomy under the Bret- 
ton  Woods  system.  Under  the  alternative  (reserve-causation) hypothesis, 
which says that the rise in the nominal supply is an  endogenous response to a 
real shock that (a)  raises the demand for money and (b)  raises the relative price 
of domestic in terms of  foreign goods with a lag, one might expect a rise in 
the international real-interest differential. Additional evidence on this point 
comes from  attempts to  model  the changes in  money-supply  differentials 
based on past changes in inflation differentials and other variables. There ap- 
pears to have been little relation between changes in the money-supply growth 
differential and lagged changes in income, inflation, or nominal-interest dif- 
ferentials. Estimates of  equations for money-growth differentials show no 
strong relation between lagged inflation differentials and the current money- 
growth differential (see table 6.5). In  fact, the point estimates of  the coeffi- 
cients of  lagged inflation differentials on the money-growth differential are 
mainly negative. When lagged differentials of the balance of payments or bal- 
ance of  trade are added to this equation, they have no additional predictive 
content for the differentials in money-supply growth rates. So this evidence 
supports the hypotheses that changes in money-growth differentials were re- 
sponsible for subsequent changes in inflation differentials, that variables that 
normally affect money-demand-growth differentials had little effect on short- 
run differentials in money-supply growth, and that short-run international dif- 
ferentials in money-supply growth were not strongly related to inflation or 
money growth in other countries. In other words, there was little international 
transmission of inflation in the short run under Bretton Woods. 
6.8  Conclusions 
International transmission of real and nominal disturbances occurs through 
many channels.  Some are independent of  the exchange-rate system, while 
others depend on that  system. Some create positive international transmis- 
sion,  while  others create negative transmission across countries. The data 
available for the Bretton Woods system after the establishment of convertible 
currencies are sufficiently short that little evidence can be obtained about most 
of the main issues regarding these channels of international transmission. Dis- 
tinguishing common shocks to real variables from their international transmis- 
16. Leeper and Gordon (1991) find no liquidity effects in the U.S. data for this period when 
changes in the money stock are treated as endogenous as in these estimates. 345  International Transmission under Bretton Woods 
'Lgble 6.5  Money-Growth Differentials 
Rvo-Tail 
Coeff.  SE  ?-Stat.  p-Value 
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Canada  Germany  Italy  UK 
R2  .29  .50  .94  .36 
Nore: These are joint instrumental variables estimates of an equation like (6). except the depen- 
dent variable is the difference between the country's nominal money-supply growth rate and that 
of  the United States, G(nation, US, Ml)). 
sion and isolating the various channels through which transmission occurs 
require longer time series than the Bretton Woods system made available to 
us. But it is possible to obtain some evidence about the short-run international 
transmission of inflation under the Bretton Woods system. This paper has pre- 
sented evidence that there was little short-run international transmission of 
inflation under Bretton Woods and that countries exercised some control over 
their own short-run inflation rates through monetary policy, despite pegged 
exchange rates. The evidence indicates that a country with a money-growth 
rate 1 percent above another country's subsequently experienced higher infla- 
tion of between one-fourth and one-half percent. This paper has argued that it 
is reasonable to interpret this as a causal relation from money-growth differ- 
entials to inflation differentials, rather than reverse causation. The reverse- 
causation hypothesis, that real shocks affecting the demand for money also 
affected international inflation differentials with a lag, raises the question of 
precisely what these disturbances were. In  addition, the evidence indicates 
that increases in the money-growth differential and subsequent increases in 
the inflation differential were associated with decreases in ex ante real interest- 
rate differentials, which might be expected from liquidity effects if the caus- 
ality ran from money growth to inflation. The reverse-causation hypothesis 
might suggest the opposite reaction for real interest rates if  increases in the 
money  supply occur  in  response  to  higher  demands for  credit.  And  the 
reverse-causation hypothesis cannot explain why money-growth differentials 
do not appear to be positively related to lagged inflation differentials. So the 
natural interpretation of  the evidence is that countries had  some scope for 346  Alan C. Stockman 
monetary-policy independence under Bretton Woods and exercised it in ways 
that limited international transmission. 
This conclusion raises new  puzzles with  both theoretical and empirical 
components. Obviously, the international transmission of  monetary  distur- 
bances and inflation under the Bretton Woods system was more complicated 
than simple models suggest. How were countries able to conduct independent 
monetary policies under the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates? 
The simplest version of  the monetary approach to the balance of  payments 
implies that independent monetary policy is impossible in a country that pegs 
its exchange rate because the one instrument of  monetary policy, the supply 
of the monetary base, must be used to peg the exchange rate. Other models 
suggest a possible role for independent monetary policy. Some (portfolio bal- 
ance) models explicitly introduce two instruments: the monetary base and the 
currency denomination of the assets that the central bank buys and sells when 
it conducts open-market operations. By  buying assets in one currency and 
selling them in another, the central bank can in principle affect relative rates 
of  return on the assets, and the exchange rate, without altering the money 
supply. This permits, in principle, separation of the pegged exchange-rate pol- 
icy from money-supply policy. Was this the main operative channel that lim- 
ited short-run international transmission of  inflation under Bretton Woods? 
Alternatively, there may be other channels through which central banks can 
conduct independent monetary policies under pegged exchange rates, perhaps 
involving distribution effects and the choices of markets and instruments used 
for open-market operations.  Were these the main  channels? If  the United 
States was a reserve-currency country, did it control the long-run inflation 
rates of Bretton Woods nations, as Darby et al. (1983) argue? Did barriers to 
international trade in goods limit arbitrage and allow each country some short- 
run control over its own nominal variables? If  so, would these barriers have 
allowed long-run control, as long as price levels did not diverge too much? If 
this  is  the key  channel that  limited international transmission of  inflation 
under Bretton Woods, what are its implications for flexible exchange rates? 
Does it imply that countries could use monetary policies to affect international 
relative prices under floating exchange rates? To  what extent does this alter 
the international transmission of real disturbances under either exchange-rate 
system? These and other related questions call for future research. 
Data Appendix 
Data are from OECD Main Economic Indicators, Citibase (all U.S. series), 
and Darby et al. (1983) (French real income). 
Canada. Data cover the entire period from 1960:l through 1971:2. 
France. Inflation, money-growth, and interest-rate data cover the entire pe- 347  International Transmission under Bretton Woods 
nod from 1960:l through 1971:2. French real income data are from Darby et 
al., and I excluded the quarter of the general strike in May 1968. Because the 
data analysis  employs lags,  this reduces  the  sample period  in  France  to 
1961:  1-1968: 1 and 1969:4-1971:2. 
Germany. Data cover the entire period from 1960:  1 through 1971:2. 
Italy. Inflation, money-growth, and real income data cover the entire period 
from  1960:l through 1971:2. The short-term interest rate is the auction rate 
on six-month Treasury bills, from OECD Main Economic Indicators: Histor- 
ical Statistics, and is available from 1960:  1 through 1969:2. 
United Kingdom.  Data cover  the  entire  sample,  except  M1  begins  in 
1963:  1. 
United States. Data from Citibase. 
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Comment  TOW Iwami 
Alan C. Stockman’s paper consists of two parts. The former (secs. 6.1-6.6) 
considers various forms of  disturbances (shocks) and possible ways in which 
they are transmitted internationally. The latter (sec. 6.7) is devoted to testing 
the possibility that independent monetary policies cause inflation differentials, 
at least in the short run, contrary to the widely accepted view of the pegged 
exchange-rate system. 
Tom Iwami is professor of economics at the University of  Tokyo. 349  International Transmission under Bretton Woods 
The logical relation between the former and the latter parts is difficult to 
understand. In the former, Stockman mainly discusses the effects of real dis- 
turbances, while his argument in the latter is not about the transmission of 
inflation but about differential inflation rates and about how these differentials 
are caused by monetary rather than real factors. 
In considering theoretical models, Stockman mentions actual settings of the 
period and compares the logical consequences of each model with the results 
of  empirical research to  date.  Undoubtedly, this is the correct procedure. 
However, I am skeptical that the various models in the former part are relevant 
to the realities of the Bretton Woods era. 
Let us take examples of  “disturbances to preference,” “technology shock,” 
and the “presence of nontraded goods.” The extent of “preference” effects is 
dubious, while technology must have been strongly related to the high-growth 
performance of the period and hence to economic fluctuations as well. But the 
relevance of Stockman’s discussion is limited because a productivity shock is 
assumed to take place in the nontradable goods industry. I will discuss below 
the productivity shock mainly to tradables. 
The reader would also like to know what kind of fluctuations in real vari- 
ables the author deduces from the previous research. Stockman refers to the 
findings of, for example, Baxter and Stockman that changes in real macroeco- 
nomic quantities were not so much affected by  the type of  an exchange-rate 
system, on the one hand, and that the cross-country correlation of  industrial 
production was higher under the Bretton Woods system than in the later pe- 
riod, on the other.’ Then I wonder how these two statements are consistent 
with each other. 
While Stockman concludes that inflation differentials resulted from auton- 
omy in monetary policy, differences in productivity growth and in prices of 
nontradables among countries would also lead to inflation differentials. The 
best example of this is the fact that, of the countries represented in his figure 
6.3, Japan has the highest average inflation rate; such a high inflation rate is 
caused by  the higher inflation rate of nontradables, whereas import price is 
determined internationally. The greater price increase of nontradables reflects 
the ever growing demand for labor force and real estate, a demand associated 
with rapid economic growth. 
In order to assess relative inflation, an econometric model based on the CPI 
is misleading. Table 6C.1 shows that the EPI (export price index) inflation 
rate of Japan is the lowest among the seven developed countries in the period 
1960-70,  despite the highest average inflation rate for the CPI. If  the inflation 
rates in Japan had been quite low for every price index, the major cause would 
have been anti-inflationary management of the money supply. The higher in- 
flation rate of the GDP deflator rejects such a possibility. 
1. See Marianne Baxter and Alan C. Stockman, “Business Cycles and the Exchange Rate Re- 
gime: Some International Evidence,”  Journal ofMonetary Economics 23, no. 3 (1989): 377-400. 350  Alan C. Stockman 
Table 6C.1  International Divergence of Inflation Rates (yearly average, %) 
~~  ~  ~ 

















































































































































Source; Toru Iwami, “Japan’s Experiences under the Bretton Woods System” (Discussion Paper 
no. 92-F-1, University of  Tokyo, Faculty of  Economics, 1992). Original data from International 
Financial Statistics: Supplement (1987). 
Note: The figure marked  a  stands for 1955-60  only and  for  1955-70  only. Inflation rates are 
calculated as log (1  + p) = (log Pr - log Po)/r,  where p is the average rate of  inflation, Pt is 
the price index of the fth year, and Po is the price index of  the benchmark year. 
Thc lower WPI inflation rate is  the result of higher-productivity growth 
specific to large-scale firms, while the cause of the still lower inflation rate of 
the EPI is twofold: first, the composition of exports shifted to goods of higher- 
productivity growth; second, exporters may have cut export prices further, to 
get a larger market share abroad at the lower margins. The real exchange rate 351  International Transmission under Bretton Woods 
of the CPI is rising, while that of the EPI is falling (see fig. 6C.  1).2 It would 
be more fruitful to interpret the inflation differentials in terms of the dynamic 
aspect of  postwar economic development.  Unfortunately, Stockman’s argu- 
ment is confined to the short-run effects because of  the limited time-series 
data. 
Another important question is how far his argument goes and what the im- 
plications are of his econometric models. The independence of monetary pol- 
icy, if any, does not imply that the balance of payments does not constitute a 
restraint on macroeconomic policy.  The developed countries seem to have 
obeyed the “rules of the game” in general under the Bretton Woods system, 
with the exception of the United  state^.^ This asymmetry enabled the devel- 
oped countries to expand their money supply despite the pegged exchange 
rates. The fact that the key-currency country, the United States, did not re- 
spond to the balance of payments deficits by contracting the money supply is 
a main characteristic that distinguishes the Bretton Woods  system from the 
classical gold ~tandard.~  Both the success in solving the international liquidity 
shortage and the consequent breakdown of  the whole system resulted from 
U. S . macroeconomic policy preferring internal rather than external balances. 
The remarkable differences in inflation rates between the two periods before 
and after the closing of the gold window suggest that the pegged exchange 
rate was the factor that imposed discipline on excessive monetary expansion, 
even in the United States. One might argue that the inflation of the 1970s was 
due mainly to the oil crisis. However, without the dollar devaluation, OPEC 
countries would not have raised oil prices so dramatically. The oil crisis was 
one of the side effects generated by the dollar devaluation. It was no coinci- 
dence that  the  so-called golden age of  capitalism (i.e.,  greater economic 
growth and a lower inflation rate) and Bretton Woods co-occurred.5 
Admittedly, the era of  fixed exchange rates with full convertibility of the 
major currencies is too short to provide us with enough data to analyze empir- 
ically the long-term effects of real as well as monetary shocks. Partly because 
of such limitations, Stockman must content himself on the whole with raising 
questions rather than answering them. 
2. The preceding discussion is based on Toru Iwami, “Japan’s Experiences under the Bretton 
Woods  System” (Discussion Paper  no. 92-F-1, University of Tokyo,  Faculty of  Economics, 
1992). The classic statement of productivity effects on the  real exchange rate  is Bela Balassa, 
“The Purchasing-Power Doctrine:  A  Reappraisal,” Journal  of  Political  Economy  72 (1964): 
3. Ronald I. McKinnon stresses that the asymmetry between the United States and the rest of 
the world continued to exist regardless of the exchange-rate system (see his comments in chap. 13 
in this volume). 
4. See Toru Iwami, “The Bretton Woods System as a Gold-Exchange Standard” (Discussion 
Paper no. 91-F-11, University of Tokyo, Faculty of Economics, 1991). 
5. On the  golden age of capitalism, see Stephen A. Marglin and Juliet B. Schor, eds., The 
Golden Age of  Capitalism: Reinterpreting  the Postwar Experience  (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990). 
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Fig. 6C.1  Yeddollar real exchange rate based on WPI, CPI, and EPI (1950- 
71) (1950 = 100) 
Source: Tom Iwami, “Japan’s Experiences under the Bretton Woods System’’ (Discussion Paper 
no. 92-F-1, University of Tokyo, Faculty of Economics,  1992). Original data from International 
Financial Statistics: Supplement (1987). 
Note: Exchange rate is expressed in terms of yeddollar. 
Comment  Bennett T.  McCallum 
Alan Stockman’s useful paper consists of two distinct parts. The first of these 
is the exposition in sections 6.1-6.6  of a theoretical framework for the analy- 
sis of the transmission, from one nation to another, of the effects of macroeco- 
nomic shocks. Although a form of  nominal price stickiness is introduced in 
section 6.6, for the most part the shocks considered are real (as opposed to 
monetary) in nature-shocks  to technology and preferences. Stockman’s de- 
velopment of this theoretical framework is expertly crafted, just as one would 
anticipate in light of his role as a major contributor to the subject.’ 
The second part of the paper, by contrast, consists of an empirical explora- 
tion (presented in  sec.  6.7) of  the proposition-implied  by  some popular 
Bennett T.  McCallum is H. J. Heinz Professor of  Economics at Camegie Mellon University 
and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
1. Among those contributions  are Alan C. Stockman, “Real Exchange Rates under Alternative 
Nominal Exchange Rate Systems,” Journal of International Money and Finance 2 (1983): 147- 
66, “The Equilibrium Approach to Exchange Rates,’’ Federal Reserve Bank  of Richmond Eco- 
nomic Review 73, no. 2 (1987): 12-31,  and “Real Exchange Rate Variability under Pegged and 
Floating Nominal Exchange-Rate  Systems: An Equilibrium Theory,” Carnegie-Rochester Confer- 
ence Series on Public Policy 29 (1988): 259-94. 353  International Transmission under Bretton Woods 
models-that  nations had no scope for monetary autonomy under the Bretton 
Woods arrangements. This exploration is not tightly linked to the framework 
developed in the first part of the paper but concerns the transmission of infla- 
tion. The following comments will, like Stockman’s presentation at the con- 
ference, focus on the second of these two distinct subjects. 
I enjoyed studying Stockman’s empirical work and would certainly agree 
with his main conclusion, namely, that the evidence from the period 1958-71 
is inconsistent with the proposition mentioned above. This empirical work is 
rather ingenious in its design; by focusing on differentials across countries and 
imposing equality restrictions on distributed-lag coefficients where permitted 
by  the data, Stockman was able to get some estimates that are statistically 
significant and come close to being economically intelligible. In my opinion, 
the results fall somewhat short of full intelligibility, however, since interest- 
rate differentials are not first-differenced as the other variables are. Except for 
that, Stockman’s equation (6) would be a distributed-lag money demand equa- 
tion  of  conventional  specification  (solved  for  the  price  level  and  first- 
differenced). It might also be noted that Stockman has been careful to report 
exactly what he is doing in his econometric work. 
There is one interpretive quibble that I will mention, nevertheless, before 
going on to more important matters. It concerns the statement that “a sus- 
tained  1 percent rise in domestic money growth relative to foreign money 
growth leads to a .28 percent rise in the inflation differential,” .28 being the 
sum of  the coefficients on the d log(Ml), variables in table 6.1. But since 
lagged values of the dependent variable are included as regressors, we need to 
divide by 1.0 minus the sum of their coefficients (i.e., by 1.0 - .27 = .73) 
to ge the steady-state effect. That would give a value of  .38, for countries 
other than Canada, which is still rather low in relation to 1.0. (For Canada, 
the number is .28/[1 -  .799] = 1.39.) 
Let us now consider Stockman’s main conclusion. It is that, in his words, 
“there was little short-run international transmission of inflation under Bretton 
Woods  and that countries exercised some control over their own short-run 
inflation rates through monetary policy, despite pegged exchange rates.” With 
regard to this conclusion, it is important that the two “short-run” qualifica- 
tions are included. If  they were excluded, this conclusion would suggest that 
it is wrong to tell one’s students that the adoption of  fixed exchange rates 
precludes a nation from choosing its own inflation rate. But, when I tell my 
students that, what I am referring to is a nation’s average inflation rate over a 
number of  years-perhaps  even a decade. Now  Stockman’s results indicate 
that, over short spans of time, nations can chose their money growth rates and 
that these influence their inflation rates. But these results do not deny that, if 
a nation maintains a 20% inflation rate for ten years, then it will be unable to 
keep its exchange rates fixed if, for example, most other nations are inflating 
at only 2% per year. Consequently, Stockman is right to state his conclusion 354  Alan C. Stockman 
in  terms of  there being some short-term or temporary  scope for monetary 
autonomy under Bretton Woods. 
Having said that, I must go on to admit that, at first glance, Stockman’s 
data seem rather inconsistent even with  the  longer-run version of  the no- 
autonomy proposition. Specifically, the series plotted in his figure 6.1 and 6.3 
appears inconsistent with the usual no-autonomy notion because Japan, Italy, 
and the Netherlands are three nations in his sample with high average inflation 
rates (according to fig. 6.3), yet figure 6.1 indicates that all three of these had 
currencies that appreciated relative to the dollar over the years of convertibil- 
ity under Bretton Woods. 
Reflection suggests that it would be more appropriate to base average infla- 
tion rates for the comparison on a somewhat longer span of time than 1962- 
67. Not having access to Bordo’s paper (chap. 1 in this volume) at the time, I 
calculated my own averages and decided to base them on the period 1957-70, 
using annual CPI data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics Year- 
book. The chosen span drops off  1971 because by then the system was break- 
ing down, and it includes 1957 and 1958 because the inflation experience of 
those years would seem to be relevant for the 1959-70 period of convertibility. 
These choices may appear rather ad hoc but nevertheless seem appropriate. 
Be that as it may,  table 6C.2 shows that the average inflation rates over 
1957-70  all fall within 1.25 points of the U.S. rate (2.58%) except for France 
and Japan-which  are about 4.5%, just over two points greater than the U.S. 
value. And these two exceptions are not troublesome from the perspective of 
the usual notion because France was in fact forced to devalue in  1958 and 
again in 1969 whereas Japan’s inflation rate was offset over these years by its 
spectacular rate  of  productivity growth-something  that  a country cannot 
achieve by macroeconomic policy measures. So the data are actually consist- 
ent with the longer-term version of the no-autonomy proposition. 
In conclusion, I would like to comment on the recently popular practice of 
testing the validity of  the purchasing power parity (PPP) doctrine as a long- 
run proposition. This topic is not explicitly on Stockman’s agenda but is in 
fact closely related because long-run validity of PPP is much the same as long- 
run incompatibility of  fixed exchange rates with inflation rate discrepancies. 
Specifically, the recent practice I am concerned with is that of testing for the 
presence or absence of cointegration of nominal exchange rates with relative 
price levels. If  these two series are not cointegrated, but instead the implied 
real exchange rates are nonstationary (in the sense that their ARMA represen- 
tations have unit roots in the AR polynomial), then the PPP is said to fail even 
as a long-run proposition.2 
2. Three references that come to hand are Mark P. Taylor, “An Empirical Examination of Long- 
Run Purchasing Power Parity Using Cointegration Techniques,” Applied Economics 20 (1988): 
1369-81;  Cletus C. Coughlin and Kees Koedijk, “What Do We  Know about the Long-Run Real 
Exchange Rate?” Federal Reserve Bank of  St. Louis Review 72,  no. 1 (1990):  36-48; and Robert 
McNown and Myles S.  Wallace, “National Price Levels, Purchasing Power Parity, and Cointegra- 
tion: A Test of Four High Inflation Economies,” Journal  of International Money and Finance 8 
(1989): 533-45.  But there are others that could be  cited. 355  International Transmission under Bretton Woods 
Table 6C.2  CPI Inflation Rates, 1957-70 
CPI, 1975 Base 










48.3  66.9 
51.0  70.2 
34.7  65.4 
55.0  74.2 
37.9  58.4 
31.8  58.0 
42.2  66.0 
35.2  54.2 






















Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (1980). 
But I would argue that to draw such a conclusion is unwarranted. Suppose 
the relevant real exchange rate is a random walk  with zero drift and small 
variance and that its evolution is independent of  monetary policy actions in 
the relevant countries. Then it remains true that major differences in money 
growth rates over a decade would have  major effects on the (nominal) ex- 
change rate and tend to dominate its behavior. Indeed, the practical messages 
of the PPP doctrine would retain their validity, provided that the doctrine is 
interpreted as a long-run matter. That would remain true, furthermore, even if 
real exchange rates were dependent at high frequencies on money growth be- 
havior, provided that there is independence at low frequencies. Note also that 
the logic of  the cointegration test would imply that one should in principle 
reject PPP if any of the system’s shock processes that affect the real exchange 
rate have even a small permanent component. As Stockman has emphasized 
in previous  writing^,^ one would surely expect this to be the case. But, even 
if  the process is entirely permanent, as in my  example, one should not jump 
to the usual conclusion. Thus, in my  opinion, the barrage of  cointegration 
tests of  PPP that we  have seen in  the literature serves primarily as another 
(unnecessary) indication of the profession’s enthusiasm for the application of 
new and undigested statistical techniques. 
General Discussion 
Sebastian Edwards followed up on Bennett McCallum’s comment that much 
of  what Stockman’s regressions are picking up is not nominal disturbances 
but structural disturbances that permanently altered the real exchange rate. 
3. Especially in Stockman, “The Equilibrium Approach to Exchange Rates,” and “Real Ex- 
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The disturbances that are important include productivity differentials via the 
Balassa effect, where one would expect countries with more rapid productiv- 
ity growth to exhibit equilibrium real appreciation; terms of trade shocks; and 
changes in tariffs and commercial policy. 
Alexander Swobodu questioned Stockman’s claim that there was no world 
inflation rate. He suggested that the approach taken in Bordo’s table 1.1 (see 
chap. 1 in this volume) comparing the degree of convergence toward an aver- 
age across regimes, would reveal a world inflation rate for the Bretton Woods 
period as well. He also suggested testing for the effects of  aggregate money 
growth (across countries) on average inflation. He also did not  agree with 
Stockman’s interpretation of his findings of little influence of changes in inter- 
national reserves on money growth as suggesting sterilization. The same re- 
sults could follow if  countries set money growth targets, which in turn in- 
duced changes in international reserves, yet  without any causality running 
from reserves to money. Huns  Genberg suggested that the author should test 
for feedback effects through interest rates and the price level. Richard Murston 
thought it was possible that, instead of  the regressions identifying a money 
demand equation, as McCallum argued in his Comment, they were identify- 
ing an endogenous money supply. 